FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

Vol. XXIII, No. 34

June 9, 1944

INVASION SPEEDS PLANS FOR WORLD ORGANIZATION

THE beginning of the long-awaited Allied invasion of Western Europe on June 5, the day after occupation of Rome by Allied forces, should give new courage to the peoples of conquered Europe awaiting liberation from Nazi rule. It also brings urgent emphasis to current discussions of the international system that might replace Hitler's "new order" in Europe. That these discussions are about to enter the stage of official negotiations among the United Nations was indicated on May 30, when President Roosevelt said this country will place before its allies a tentative project for a form of world organization, and Secretary of State Hull announced he had invited the British, Russian and Chinese governments, through their Ambassadors in Washington, to open conversations on the basis of this project. Mr. Hull's announcement was preceded by a series of meetings at which members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were afforded an opportunity to discuss with the Secretary details of the post-war plans drafted by the State Department.

WHO SHOULD REPRESENT WHOM? The initiative taken by the United States, if translated into concrete measures, may prove a milestone on the arduous road toward world order. But there is no lack of skeptics of various schools of thought who doubt the possibility of forming what Sumner Welles has called "a true world organization" until the war is over, and Europe has achieved a measure of stability. One argument frequently heard is that it is impracticable, in this period of political confusion, to determine what governments are entitled to represent certain countries — notably France, Poland, Yugoslavia and Greece — on a political council of the United Nations, and that we must wait until these countries have acquired stable governments duly recognized by the great powers before such a council can be established. Meanwhile, it is contended, the great powers can act as benevolent trustees on behalf of the small nations.

The weakness of this argument is its assumption that liberation will, of itself, bring about the establishment in every one of the liberated countries of governments acceptable to the United States, Britain and Russia. If we are to wait until this happy event has taken place, then world organization can be relegated to the millenium. The war has precipitated a series of political explosions all over the world, which may have the effect of time-bombs in the postwar period. We might just as well face the fact that it will prove impossible, at any given moment of history, to achieve uniformity in the political institutions of unequally developed countries, and that the great powers will have to work with some governments we-or the British, or the Russians-do not like, until conditions in their countries have made the establishment of other governments feasible. It must be hoped that the liberated countries, once they have recovered from the shock of war and terrorism, will be able to develop the kind of institutions and practices that would facilitate their collaboration with the great powers, and that the latter, meanwhile, will encourage freedom of choice by the people of each of these countries. But any attempt by the great powers to dictate the kind of government the small nations should have, or to bar their participation in an international organization until they have satisfied certain criteria, would merely confirm the fear—voiced again on May 31 by Eelco Van Kleffens, Netherlands Foreign Minister—that the great powers intend to ignore the small nations in. their plans for the post-war period. Mr. Hull sought to dispel this fear in his statement of June 1, when he said that this country's traditional championship of liberty should give assurance to the small nations that they will be treated as equals in the proposed world organization.

ORDER PLUS FREEDOM. The small nations

are aware—more than ever now after their grueling experience under Nazi rule—that they will be unable to enjoy freedom unless there is some measure of order in Europe, and that order will depend on the extent to which the great powers can assure security against future aggression by any nation. The crucial problem of relations between nations—as of human beings within nations—is to reconcile order with freedom. It is becoming increasingly clear that Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, each naturally influenced by the particular interests of the country he heads, believe that post-war order can be best achieved if military force is retained by those who now possess it —the United States, Britain and Russia. It is, of course, true that one of the reasons for the failure of the League of Nations was that it had no military force at its disposal. It must also be recognized that it may be a long time before the various countries of the world will be ready to entrust control of their military forces to a world organization. The pattern apparently favored by President Roosevelt, and with some differences in emphasis also by Churchill, is an executive council composed of the great powers, which would direct the use of the military force at the command of each, but would perhaps be willing, when the time is deemed appropriate, to consult an assembly of small nations on matters of principle and policy. This pattern, it is said, is the only practicable approach to the problem of security, since the great powers would be unwilling to have the small nations—rich in many values precious to civilization, but poor in the sinews of war—decide how the armed forces of the United States, Britain or Russiashould be used in any given contingency.

The difficulty with this argument, however, is that, once hostilities are over, considerations other than those of military power will gain the ascendancy as men resume peacetime tasks. It is by no means clear that at that stage the great powers will necessarily agree any more than the members of the League concerning the issues that lead to aggression, and thus to the use of military force, unless some permanent framework of collaboration in other spheres—poli-

tical, economic, social—has meanwhile been established. The League of Nations failed, among other things, not because its individual members lacked power, actual or potential, but because they lacked the will to make use of their power for other than their own ends—and did not agree among themselves as to the ends worth pursuing.

Without such willingness and such agreement any world organization of the future, even if restricted to a great-power directorate, will prove as impotent as the League. A military coalition is a most important outward shell—but a shell nevertheless which must be judged by its content. If the three great powers should maintain their military coalition in the post-war period only to enforce their will on smaller and weaker nations, then liberation of Europe from Nazi rule will only open another chapter of conflict and revolt. If, on the other hand, they are willing to place their military power at the service of an international organization in which other nations are given an opportunity to participate—and to participate not at some date in the dim future to be fixed by the Big Three, but right now, while liberation is under way—then we may look forward to a period when all nations, great and small, can learn together the difficult, sometimes seemingly hopeless, art of working out their common problems. As President Roosevelt has said: "Nations will learn to work together only by actually working together." All arguments in favor of postponing cooperation to some date when things may seem easier or the portents for its success more propitious are only so many ways of rationalizing our unwillingness to pass from words to deeds. The peoples of Europe have proved their hatred of Nazi dictatorship by resisting it under conditions of suffering we cannot even imagine. We must not only help to liberate them from the physical torture of Nazi rule. We must go further, and use military victory to liberate them—and ourselves from the spectre of another such catastrophe.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The third of three articles on United States policy in Europe.)

CANADIANS WEIGH FUTURE COURSE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Premier Curtin of Australia, visiting Canada en route from the recent London Conference of the Dominion Prime Ministers, reiterated his belief in the necessity of closer unity among the five British nations in an address on June 1 to a joint assembly of the Houses of Parliament in Ottawa. Although the statement issued by the London Conference indicated that plans for the closer integration of the British Commonwealth have been temporarily dismissed, the speech suggests that the issue is by no means wholly closed. The views of Mackenzie King, Canada's Prime Minister, in opposition to the scheme unquestionably reflect the majority opinion in Can-

ada; yet a debate on foreign policy is shortly due at Ottawa, where the questions which originally prompted the discussion will be re-examined.

CANADA INDEPENDENT. Canada's position in these discussions is due to the historical development that has brought the country to an independent Dominion status. But the war effort itself has emphasized a new sense of prestige which Canada does not wish to relinquish. Canada ranks fourth among the United Nations in munitions production. Its suggestions for an international monetary agreement were submitted independently of Britain and the United States, and Canadians have served in a capac-

ity of equality on several of the Combined Boards in Washington which coordinate Allied economic policy. Canada's new status is also reflected in the larger number of diplomatic representatives it has sent abroad, several of whom have been raised to ambassadorial rank. Basically, however, Canada's economy depends on that of the United States and, in matters of trade, also on that of the United Kingdom. Evidence of this is given in plans for reconversion. Canada's reconversion, while simpler than ours so far as the number of industrial plants is concerned, is complicated by the need to await actual reconversion and re-equipment in the United States before similar measures can be adopted in Canada. Nor are Canadians unaware of the problems created by their geographic position, between the United States on the south and Russia on the north.

FRAMING FOREIGN POLICY. It is these facts —internal developments and the strategic position occupied by Canada—which explain the nature of its current proposals on foreign affairs. Canadians tend to think of their post-war policy in terms almost solely of defense of the north Atlantic and north Pacific areas, respectively. This policy springs from the new-found sense of independent action and probably also from isolationist sentiment which persists in some areas. Although proud of their contribution in the present world-wide struggle, they find it difficult to perceive any future Canadian interest in such regions as the Middle East or even in the southwest Pacific, despite the fact that two sister Dominions are located there. Canadians recognize the need for a strong United Kingdom, but largely as a great air base off the European continent. They also recognize the ultimate strength of the United States, and have a consequent desire to continue the collaboration with this country for mutual defense developed during the present war.

At the same time there is an evident inability in Canada to project into the post-war period what in essence are inter-Commonwealth or even world-wide

What kind of peace with non-Nazi Germany? Should Allies establish military administration? Will Russia share in administration? Read:

WHAT FUTURE FOR GERMANY? by Vera Micheles Dean

25c

FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS, Vol. XVIII, No. 22
REPORTS are published on the 1st and 15th of each month.
Subscription \$5; to F.P.A. members, \$3.

181

commitments today. However much Canada may insist on retaining constitutional authority in any Commonwealth development, it will be no less affected by future events within the Commonwealth than in the critical days of 1939. Certainly the reasons which gave rise to the Smuts-Halifax statement and the earlier Curtin proposals for centralization still remain. The London Conference did not meet Britain's need for assured strength with respect to other great powers. Since Canada desires a strong United Kingdom, it should have a natural concern in this matter.

WORLD-WIDE COMMITMENTS. Yet Canada hesitates to make further commitments, although it is true that government officials are on record along with those of the other United Nations in favor of a post-war international organization. At present, it is felt, United Nations plans are very vague, and tend to suggest re-creation of a balance of power system which is contrary to Canada's ideas. Yet Canada believes the great powers must take the lead in establishing an international security organization and would be prepared to adhere to such an organization if established. Canada is not without effective bargaining power in excess even of its potential strength. Strategically located at the crossroads of future air traffic, its policies in the field of international aviation may well prove decisive. Perhaps less effective will be its bargaining power in freeing international trade from the onerous restrictions represented by the Ottawa imperial preferences and the American tariff, for Canada's dependence on foreign trade will inevitably lead it in the direction of liberalizing trade.

It is to be hoped that the great powers may elaborate a broad security framework wherein countries such as Canada may find their proper and satisfactory position. If the wider security basis of an international organization is not provided, the internal contradictions expressed in Canada's policies would eventually defeat its long-term interests.

GRANT S. McClellan

The Nazi Economic System, by Otto Nathan. Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1944. \$4.00

A former adviser to the German Ministry of Economics presents the most comprehensive available study of the Nazi economy, which he describes as a totalitarian system of government control within the framework of private property and private profit, contrasting it with complete state ownership or a democratically planned economy.

The Americas and Tomorrow, by Virginia Prewett. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1944. \$3.00

A discussion of inter-American cooperation and what it should mean.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXIII, No. 34, June 9, 1944. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. Frank Ross McCoy, President; Dorothy F. Leet, Secretary; Vera Micheles Dran, Editor. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

Washington News Letter



REVOLUTIONS TEST GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

While the attention of the United States is necessarily focused on theatres of war in Europe and Asia, the Administration is fully aware of the need of cementing our relations with the countries of Latin America, some of which have recently displayed tendencies unfriendly to the Good Neighbor Policy.

Since the Spanish Falange has energetic, although small, New World outposts which spread propaganda unfriendly to this country, President Roosevelt found it wise on May 30 to say he believes that Spain's activities as a neutral have been less than satisfactory. For reasons of expediency, both this country and Britain are dealing gently with Spain in public. But, while the Franco régime is weaker than a year ago, the Falange dominates the Spanish government, and complacency toward Franco is interpreted as complacency toward the Falange. Thus Latin America remains in the foreground of our foreign policy. Among the reasons why Secretary of State Hull on June 1 gave assurances that small nations will be "kept on a position of equality with all others" is that it is a basic fact of the Good Neighbor policy that the small and large nations of the Americas are equals in international decisions.

INTERAMERICAN TEST IN ECUADOR. The Ecuadorean revolution of May 29, which forced the resignation of Dr. Carlos Arroyo del Rio and the installation of Dr. José María Velasco Ibarra as his successor, provides a double test of inter-American political cooperation. Resolution 22 of the Rio de Janeiro Conference of 1942 calls for consultation among the American Republics on the question of recognizing governments which take office as the result of force. The Republics therefore promptly set in motion the machinery of consultation on the change in Ecuador. The revolution also raised the question whether the new government would abide by the inter-American settlement of the Ecuadorean-Peruvian boundary dispute on May 21. On May 8 Dr. Velasco Ibarra, in an interview in Bogota, expressed his willingness to accept the settlement which transferred to Peru territory formerly claimed by Ecuador.

No indication has come that the consultation under Resolution 22 will result in nonrecognition of the new Ecuadorean government. The revolution, which broke out under military leadership a few days before the date set for the Presidential election, had its origin in domestic affairs, and apparently no outside influences were at work. Ecuadoreans have

been irked by the economic instability of their country, which is suffering from inflation, and del Rio angered some of the population by keeping in exile Velasco Ibarra, leader of the Democratic Alliance and his strongest potential opponent in the scheduled elections. The revolutionary President promised to "deliver the country to a constitutional assembly," which presumably will choose a constitutional President.

The danger of current revolutions in Latin America is that they might bring to the fore nationalists eager to embarrass the United States. This fortunately did not prove to be the case in El Salvador, where the revolution of May 8 replaced General Maximiliano Hernandez Martínez in the Presidency with Senator Andres Ignacio Menendez.

CUBA'S ELECTION. Constitutional processes in Cuba on June 2 won the position of President-elect for Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, whose opponent in the elections was the government coalition candidate Dr. Carlos Saladrigas. President after the revolution which overthrew Gerardo Machado in 1933, Grau then was not favored by the United States and in 1934 lost his post to Fulgencio Batista, whom he will now succeed. It is encouraging for the future of democratic institutions in Cuba that President Batista accepted the defeat of his candidate in a constitutional manner.

At present, Bolivia is the foremost problem in inter-American affairs, and the New World republics are reconsidering their refusal to recognize the revolutionary government of Gualberto Villaroel. The governments of Brazil, Chile and Peru are reported to have notified Washington that nonrecognition puts difficulties in the way of necessary dealings with Bolivia. While the United States is eager to cooperate with the other Republics in this matter, its policy must be determined by the facts in the case, which have just been examined on the spot by Avra Warren, United States Ambassador to Panama.

The departure from the Villaroel government of Paz Estenssoro and others accused of acting as agents for interests outside Bolivia unfriendly to Good Neighborliness has paved the way for Secretary Hull to amend, if the Administration wishes him to, his earlier announcement that the United States would not deal with the régime. The government of General Edelmiro Farrell in Argentina, which is following an increasingly nationalistic policy, will continue to go unrecognized, however.

BLAIR BOLLES